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The authors explore the relation between the 
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of the electricity sector. The authors exploit a unique 
dataset comprising firm-level information on a 
representative sample of 220 electric utilities from 51 
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Until the 1990s, most infrastructure utilities were self regulated or under the 
control of a Ministry, with tariffs and employment reflecting political concerns much 
more than the efficiency and financial sustainability of service delivery. Average 
tariffs seldom recovered costs and employment was generally well in excess of what 
was needed to ensure the efficient service delivery. By maintaining tariff below costs 
or imposing employment levels, politicians were buying short term political gains, but 
were also impeding the ability of the sector to generate enough cash to expand as 
needed while maintaining the financial viability of the operations. In this context, one 
of the main objectives of the reforms of the 1990s was to reduce political interference 
with the operation of utilities. The creation of independent regulators was central to an 
effort that in many cases also involved some kind of private involvement in the 
operation.
1  
The establishment of an independent regulatory agency was viewed as a strong 
signal of the government’s commitment to replace political considerations by 
economic concerns. Independent regulators are expected to be capable of monitoring 
the performance of individual operators without interference from operators or from 
government. On the one hand, independence would allow regulators to keep 
politicians at a safe distance of the control of prices, quality, and quantities of 
services. On the other hand, independence would allow regulators to penalize 
operators, whether private or public, for failures to deliver on their explicit or implicit 
contractual commitments.  
                                                           
1 Estache and Goicoechea (2005) show that the proportion of countries with an independent regulatory 
agency in the electricity sector increased from 4% in 1990 to 54% in 2004, while the proportion of 
countries with private involvement in the operation of distribution companies in the same period 
increased from 4% to 37%. 
  2The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the connection between the 
creation of regulatory agencies and the performance of electricity operators in 
developing and transition countries. Our hypothesis is that, compared to self-
regulation or control by a Ministry, a regulatory agency can do a better job at 
monitoring electricity distribution companies and can take remedial action if 
necessary. More specifically, regulatory agencies are expected to set tariffs that are in 
line with efficient costs, to ensure that minimum quality-of-service standards are met, 
and to enforce the targets for connection of new customers imposed by the 
governments.  
The hypothesis of potential performance improvements associated to the 
creation of an independent regulator for infrastructure industries has been debated for 
over 10-15 years now (see Kessides, 2004). The empirical literature on the impact of 
reforms on the performance of individual operators, however, has mainly focused on 
the impact of privatization.
2  
We investigate the connection between regulatory agencies and the performance 
of operators in the electricity distribution sector. Our empirical analysis takes 
advantage of a unique dataset that allows disentangling the impact of establishing a 
regulatory agency from the impact of private participation in a context in which 
increased private participation has been quite significant. 
We first focus on the impact of regulatory agencies on firm efficiency as 
approximated by a labor requirement function. We then check the robustness of our 
                                                           
2 Megginson and Netter (2001) provide a survey of empirical studies on privatization. More recently, 
Andres et al. (2006) propose a very thorough assessment of the impact of privatization on various 
dimensions of performance of Latin American electricity distribution companies. Gassner et al. (2006) 
evaluate the connection between reforms and performance in developing and transitional countries 
(emphasizing the impact of privatization) by using partial performance indicators. Estache and Rossi 
(2005) focus on the impact of regulatory regime rather than institutions. Zhang et al. (2005) study the 
impact of reforms in developing countries in the electricity generation sector, emphasizing on the 
sequencing of reforms. Guasch (2004) studies the impact of regulatory agencies on the odds of 
renegotiation. 
  3results by analyzing firms’ performance in terms of partial indicators such as workers 
per connection, operating expenditures, and energy losses. Of course, the regulator is 
of limited use to the users if improvements on the supply side do not translate into 
improvements in the service received by the users. To track this we use three 
measures of social welfare: service coverage, frequency of interruptions, and 
residential tariffs.  
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 
presents the econometric model. Section 4 shows the empirical results and provides 
evidence of their robustness. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
We exploit a unique dataset comprising firm-level information on 220 electric 
utilities from 51 development and transition countries for the period 1985 to 2005. 
The dataset includes the following variables: total electricity sold (in MWh), total 
number of connections in the utility area, total number of residential connections in 
the utility area, length of distribution network (in kilometres), total number of 
employees, operation expenditures (OPEX, in US dollars), average residential tariff 
(in US dollars), electricity losses due to technical and non-technical reasons (as a 
proportion of total electricity sold), frequency of interruptions (number per year), 
service coverage in the utility area, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm is under the control of a regulatory agency (for more than six months), and a 
dummy a variable that takes the value of one if the firm received private participation 
(for more than six months). We define private participation as a situation where the 
private operator has control over the operation of the utility. We have also information 
on a set of country-level covariates including corruption, as measured by the 
Corruption Index produced by International Country Risk Guide (which ranges 
  4between six -highly clean- and zero -highly corrupt-); quality of the bureaucracy, as 
measured by the Bureaucracy Quality Index produced by International Country Risk 
Guide (which ranges between four -high quality- and zero -low quality-); the stock of 
the external debt (outstanding and disbursed, in US dollars); GDP per capita (in US 
dollars); a political dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country is under 
an IMF agreement; and population density. Summary statistics are presented in Table 
1. 
Our sample is representative of the energy sector in development and transition 
countries. It covers the following countries: Argentina (22 firms supplying electricity 
to approximately 75% of the total number of customers in the country), Azerbaijan (5, 
100%), Belize (1, 100%), Bolivia (7, 88%), Botswana (1, 100%), Brazil (57, 99%), 
Burkina Faso (1, 100%), Cameroon (1, 100%), Cape Verde (1, 100%), Central 
African Republic (1, 100%), Colombia (11, 74%), Costa Rica (8, 100%), Czech 
Republic (8, 84%), Djibouti (1, 100%), Ecuador (20, 100%), El Salvador (5, 100%), 
Eritrea (1, 100%), Estonia (1, 85%), Ethiopia (1, 100%), Georgia (1, 32%), Ghana (1, 
100%), Guatemala (3, 100%), India (5, 20%), Ivory Coast (1, 100%), Kenya (1, 
100%), Malawi (1, 100%), Malaysia (2, 99%), Mali (1, 100%), Mauritania (1, 100%), 
Mauritius (1, 100%), Mexico (2, 100%), Moldova (5, 100%), Morocco (1, 81%), 
Mozambique (1, 77%), Namibia (1, 20%), Nicaragua (2, 99%), Niger (1, 100%), 
Panama (3, 100%), Paraguay (2, 100%), Peru (15, 96%), Philippines (1, 20%), Poland 
(2, 23%), Russia (3, 4%), Senegal (1, 100%), Slovak Republic (3, 100%), South 
Africa (1, 99%), Tanzania (1, 96%), Uganda (1, 99%), Uruguay (1, 100%), Zambia 
(1, 100%), and Zimbabwe (1, 100%). 
3. Methodology  
  5The objective is to identify the impact of introducing a regulatory agency on 
firm performance and social welfare in the electricity sector in developing and 
transition countries.  
Our empirical analysis takes advantage of the fact that in the past two decades 
not all developing and transition countries introduced regulatory agencies and that 
those countries that introduced regulatory agencies did it at different moments of 
time, thus providing variation across time and space that we propose to use in order to 
identify the causal effect of the introduction of regulatory agencies on firm 
performance and social welfare. 
The distribution of firms according to their regulation and ownership status at 
the end of the sample period is summarized in Table 2. The sequencing of the reforms 
in countries covered by our sample is summarized in Table 3. There are 38 firms 
(operating in 11 countries) for which private participation arrived before the 
regulatory agency was established, 54 firms (operating in 17 countries) for which the 
regulatory agency was established before private participation, and only 17 firms 
(operating in four countries) for which private sector participation arrived during the 
same year in which the regulatory agency was established. The observed variation in 
the sequencing of the reform process allows disentangling the impact of establishing a 
regulatory agency from the impact of private participation.  
A methodological concern in this type of study is that governments choose 
whether to introduce a regulatory agency and that choice may be correlated to 
unobservable factors that also affect performance and welfare. A common method of 
controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is to use panel data and to 
estimate a difference-in-differences model. Formally, the difference-in-differences 
model may be specified as 
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where   is the natural logarithm of the output of interest (labor, operating 
expenditures, service coverage, quality of service, energy losses, or tariffs) for firm i 
in period t, 
it Y
it X  is a set of regressors,   is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if firm i operates under the control of a regulatory agency during period t, 
it D
i α  is a 
time-invariant firm effect,  t μ  is a time effect common to all firms in period t, and  it ε  
is a firm time-varying error distributed independently across firms and time and 
independently of all  i α  and  t μ . The parameter of interest,β , is the difference-in-
differences estimate of the average effect of introducing a regulatory agency on the 
output of interest.  
4. Results 
Our first set of estimations focuses on firm efficiency. Consistent with the 
literature on the estimation of the relative efficiency of electric utilities, the model 
proposed here includes a variable input (the number of employees), an exogenous 
capital input (the kilometers of distribution network), and two exogenous outputs (the 
total number of connections and the total energy supplied to final customers).  
As observed by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) productivity in distribution 
is, to a large extent, driven by management and efficient labor use; accordingly, the 
concept of efficiency used through this study is labor-use efficiency (labor 
productivity): a firm is inefficient if it uses more labor to produce a given bundle of 
outputs than an otherwise efficient firm would. Our goal, then, is to explain the 
determinants of labor use, including a variety of technological factors, the 
characteristics of service, the presence of a regulatory agency, and a set of controls. 
  7In general, electricity distribution firms have the obligation to meet demand; 
therefore we consider the amount of electricity sold to final customers and the number 
of connections as exogenous outputs. In many applications service area is included as 
an exogenous output in the econometric model. Being constant over time, in our 
model service area is captured by the individual effect. 
The number of employees is our measure of labor input. The only capital input 
in our model is the length of the electricity network in kilometers. As noted by 
Neuberg (1977) and Kumbakhar and Hjalmarsson (1998) distributors have limited 
control over the length of distribution lines, since the amount of capital embodied in 
the network reflects geographical dispersion of customers rather than differences in 
productive efficiency. Therefore, we treat distribution lines as an exogenous capital 
variable representing the characteristics of the network. 
The electricity technology is represented by means of a labor requirement 
function. We use a translog functional form because it provides a second-order 
approximation to a broad class of functions. The translog labor requirement function 
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where   are the natural logarithms of labor, sales, connections, and 
distribution lines.  
12 , X , X , and X Y
We expect regulatory agencies to have a positive impact on labor productivity 
for both public operators and private operators ( ) 0 β < . Public operators may be 
thought as having the objective of delivering energy subject to a constraint of 
minimum employment and maximum price. In practice, there has been little 
accountability for the outcomes associated to this optimization program simply 
  8because self regulation or regulation by the political process allowed public operators 
to avoid this accountability. By getting an independent monitoring of the performance 
of operators, the creation of a regulatory agency increases the accountability for the 
quality and quantity of service, reducing the scope for inefficient employment levels. 
Thus, the creation of a regulatory agency allows public operators to run employment 
decisions much more in line with a profit maximizing criteria, leading to a reduction 
in labor requirements. The underlying story is different for private operators. The idea 
of non-regulated monopolists being inefficient has been there for a while. For 
instance, Hicks (1935) argues that the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life. On 
the same grounds, Hart (1983) suggests that the lack of relevant benchmarks for 
comparing managerial performance in monopoly markets may be the cause of 
managerial slack. If this were the case, the introduction of a regulator would push 
private operators to minimize costs and hence to reduce employment.  
Ordinary Least Squares estimates of Equation (2) are reported in Table 4. A 
typical concern when using difference-in-differences is the potential problem of serial 
correlation, which results in biased standard errors and generates over-rejection 
(Bertrand et al., 2004). In order to address this concern we report standard errors 
clustered at the firm level.  
As usual for translog function approximations, the outputs and the capital input 
have been mean corrected; therefore, the first-order coefficients are elasticities 
evaluated at the sample mean. The first-order output coefficients are statistically 
significant and have the expected signs regarding economic behavior: an increase in 
outputs is associated with an increase in the use of labor. The time dummies are 
statistically significant in all models and imply an average rate of labor productivity 
growth in the sector of about 3.5% per year. Overall, estimates regarding 
  9technological parameters are in line with the specialized literature on electricity 
distribution, yielding further confidence to the validity of the estimation strategy. 
The first column of Table 4 reports the labor-requirement difference-in-
differences model without controls, apart from firm fixed effects and year dummies. 
The coefficient on the regulatory agency dummy variable is negative and statistically 
significant. The coefficient is also significant in economic terms: firms operating 
under the control of a regulatory agency use about 9.5% less labor to produce a given 
bundle of outputs.  
Our use of energy sold as a measure of output might bias our estimates if the 
presence of a regulatory agency is correlated with energy losses. As pointed out by 
Bagdadioglu et al. (1996), network losses reflect the quality of the network system in 
terms of how much power is lost in the transformers and during distribution, and how 
much power is uncounted due to other reasons, such as illegal use. Technical losses 
are related to the square of the distance transmitted, and hence our econometric model 
captures them. Our main concern is related to non-technical losses associated to 
illegal use. In order to address the problem of whether including network losses have 
any impact on the estimated coefficients we replace “sales” by “sales + energy 
losses”. As shown in Column (2), the coefficient on regulatory agency is still 
significantly associated to lower labor requirements.  
In order to control for ownership type, in Column (3) we include an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm is privately owned and zero otherwise. 
The negative and statistically significant association between the private dummy 
variable and labor efficiency suggests that private firms outperform public firms. The 
negative and significant association between the regulatory agency dummy variable 
and labor persists, though the coefficient is lower than the one obtained in the model 
  10without controlling for private ownership. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients suggests that private participation has more impact on labor requirements 
than the establishment of a regulatory agency. 
To further explore the effects of the reform process we interact the regulatory 
agency dummy with the private dummy. As shown in Column (4) the interaction 
effect is not significant, suggesting that there is no differential impact of regulatory 
agencies on labor efficiency according to ownership type. 
In Column (5) we include the proportion of residential connections as an 
environmental variable that should capture the effect of delivering energy to different 
type of customers. The proportion of residential connections is not significant at any 
of the usual confidence levels and it appears not to have any impact on the sign or 
significance of other coefficients. In particular, regulatory agency remains negatively 
associated with labor efficiency. 
As suggested by Dal Bó and Rossi (2007), corruption may divert managerial 
effort away from the productive process, and the way for firms to meet their service 
obligations is to use more inputs. Additionally, a regulatory agency might have a 
different impact according to the country’s level of corruption. Thus, in Column (6) 
we include country-level corruption and its interaction with regulatory agency as 
additional controls. In this specification the coefficient of corruption is negative and 
significant, indicating that more corruption in the country is associated with more 
labor-inefficient firms, while the coefficient on the interaction is not significant. 
Again, regulatory agency remains strongly associated with lower labor requirements.   
Even after controlling for corruption, a concern is that there may be other 
country characteristics that are correlated with both labor-efficiency and the presence 
of a regulatory agency. To address this concern we control for a number of observed 
  11country-level time-varying characteristics, such as GDP per capita, population 
density, and quality of the bureaucracy. The coefficients on these country-level 
controls are individually and jointly not significant. The sign, magnitude, and 
significance of the coefficients of interest remain unaltered.
3 
As pointed out by Heckman et al. (1997), an important source of bias in the 
difference-in difference approach could arise when treated and control firms are not 
compared at common values of matching variables. We deal with this potential 
problem of comparing the incomparable by applying the difference-in-differences 
approach to the support common to treated firms and control firms (defined as the 
sub-sample obtained by deleting all observations of control firms with an estimated 
propensity score lower than the minimum one of the treated group and all 
observations of treated firms with an estimated propensity score higher than the 
maximum one of the control group). We estimate the propensity score from a Probit 
model of the probability of the introduction of a regulatory agency at some point 
during the sample window as a function of a set of average pre-treatment 
characteristics, such as GDP per capita, quality of the bureaucracy, IMF agreement, 
and electricity losses. All explanatory variables in the estimated Probit model (not 
reported) are statistically significant, and the balancing property is satisfied. In 
alternative specifications we tried including other firm-level characteristics, such as 
labor productivity and service coverage, but they were not significant. As shown in 
Table 5, results corresponding to the difference-in-differences approach applied to the 
common support are consistent with previous results. 
To further validate our results we perform additional estimations under a wide 
range of alternative specifications and samples. The value and significance of the 
                                                           
3 Results mentioned but not reported are available from the authors upon request. 
  12coefficients of interest remain unchanged when we drop one firm at the time or one 
country at the time, when we estimate a Cobb-Douglas instead of a translog labor 
requirement function, and when the variables are included in levels rather than in 
logs. Conclusions in terms of the significance of the coefficients remain also 
unchanged when standard errors are clustered at country-year combinations. 
Other measures of firm performance and social welfare 
Table 6 reports estimates of the impact of regulatory agencies on three measures 
of firm efficiency (labor per connection, operating expenditures per connection, and 
electricity losses) and three measures of social welfare (service coverage, frequency 
of interruptions, and average residential tariffs).  
Labor per connection is a weaker measure of labor efficiency than the one 
obtained from the labor requirement model, but it has the advantage of allowing us to 
increase the number of firms and countries in the sample compared to the labor 
requirement specification. Difference-in-differences estimates for the labor per 
connection specification confirms the labor requirement results: regulatory agencies 
have a positive impact on labor productivity and private firms outperform public ones 
in terms of labor productivity. As in the labor requirement case, the impact from 
private participation is more important than the impact from the presence of 
regulatory agencies. Again, there are no effects arising from the interaction between 
regulatory agencies and ownership. 
We then consider operating expenditures as a performance indicator. Using 
operating expenses has the advantage of including expenditures for work contracted 
outside the firm, thus making the measure of variable inputs more comparable 
between firms with different levels of horizontal integration. Results for operating 
expenditures per connection suggest that regulatory agencies have a positive impact 
  13on firm efficiency, in the sense that they incur in lower operating expenditures. Again, 
there is no differential impact of regulatory agencies according to ownership type.  
Our third measure of firm efficiency is the electricity that is lost in the 
distribution process. As shown in Column (3) of Table 6, the coefficients for 
ownership and regulatory agency are not significant in the equation for the electricity 
that is lost for technical and non-technical reasons. Energy losses, however, tend to be 
lower for private firms operating under the control of a regulatory agency. 
So far, the partial performance indicators have focused on the supply side of the 
business. From the point of view of users, other dimensions are much more important. 
We have information of three such dimensions: quality of service, access to the 
service as measured by the coverage rate, and average residential tariff (that gives a 
sense of the affordability of the service provided).  
Column (4) reports results for quality of service, as measured by the frequency 
of interruption of the electricity service. The presence of a regulatory agency is 
strongly associated with a decrease in the frequency of interruption, and this 
association is similar for private and public firms. The coefficient on the private 
dummy variable is not significant in this specification. 
As reported in Column (5), there is a positive association between regulatory 
agencies and service coverage. Furthermore, the positive and significant coefficient of 
the interaction variable indicates that regulatory agencies have a stronger impact on 
service coverage for private firms.  
Finally, estimates from the model in Column (6) indicates that being a private 
firm operating under a regulatory agency is negatively associated to average 
residential tariffs. These results suggest that residential customers have benefited, 
through lower tariffs, from the significant improvements in labor productivity 
  14associated to privatization. Interestingly, regulatory agencies have a positive impact 
on public-firms average tariffs, a result that is likely to reflect improvements in cost 
recovery efforts and tariff rebalancing associated with the typical mandate assigned to 
independent regulators. 
In Table 7 we apply the difference-in-differences approach to the sample 
restricted to the common support. Again, results corresponding to the difference-in-
differences in common support are consistent with previous results. 
Overall, our empirical analysis suggests that the establishment of regulatory 
agencies in developing and transition countries is associated with higher social 
welfare. Again, to validate our results we perform a number of robustness checks. 
First, the sign, magnitude, and significance of the coefficients of interest remain 
mostly unchanged when we drop one firm at the time or one country at the time. 
Second, results remain unaltered when we include country-level controls such as GDP 
per capita. Finally, conclusions in terms of the significance of the coefficients remain 
also unaltered when standard errors are clustered at country-year combinations. 
5. Conclusions 
We have presented what we believe is the first attempt at using firm-level data 
to evaluate the impact of introducing a regulatory agency on firm performance and 
social welfare. Our analysis focuses on the electricity distribution sector in developing 
and transition countries, and it includes three measures of firm performance (labor 
productivity, operation expenditures per connection, and electricity losses) and three 
measures of social welfare (service coverage, frequency of interruptions, and 
residential tariffs). 
  15The overall picture emerging from our empirical analysis is that the introduction 
of regulatory agencies in developing and transition countries is associated with more 
efficient firms and with higher social welfare.  
Our empirical results indicate that regulatory agencies are strongly associated 
with higher labor efficiency at the firm level in the sense that less labor is used to 
produce a given level of output. We also find that private firms are substantially more 
efficient in their use of labor than state-owned firms. The estimated effects are large 
in economic terms.  The association we identify between regulatory agencies and firm 
efficiency is robust. To deal with problems of omitted variable bias we controlled for 
time effects, firm effects, and a set of time-varying firm-level and country-level 
regressors. The association between regulatory agencies and labor efficiency remains 
significant in the presence of all of these variables. This is interesting because it 
suggests that the presence of a regulatory agency plays a separate role that is distinct 
from the impact of private sector participation and from an unstable or insecure 
environment. The effect of regulatory agencies remains significant when taking into 
account the problem of energy theft.  
In order to check our focus on labor efficiency, we estimate an alternative 
productivity model using operating expenditures instead of the number of employees. 
Again, we find regulatory agencies to be associated with higher firm efficiency. We 
also explore the impact of regulatory agencies on the electricity that is lost due to 
technical and non-technical reasons. We find that private firms operating under the 
control of a regulatory agency have lower energy losses. 
Aside from firm efficiency we also explore the impact of regulatory agencies on 
social welfare. First, regulatory agencies are strongly associated to a decrease in the 
frequency of interruptions. Second, regulatory agencies have a positive impact on 
  16coverage rates, and this impact is stronger for private firms. Finally, we find a positive 
impact of regulatory agencies on welfare through lower tariffs, although the impact in 
this case is restricted to private firms.  
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  19Table 1. Summary statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Sample size 
Firm-level variables:     
Electricity sold (MWh)  66829600  450549307  2644 
Connections 726930  1688384  2583 
Residential connections  616798  1431352  2362 
Distribution network (Km)  22561  68274  1288 
Employees 2947  6855  2253 
OPEX per connection  255  413  515 
Proportion of energy lost  0.16  0.08  2324 
Interruption frequency rate  5380  14971  158 
Coverage 0.79  0.21  1634 
Average residential tariff  107  184  1713 
Private participation  0.29  0.46  2814 
Regulatory agency  0.52  0.50  2899 
Country-level variables:     
Corruption   2.90  0.79  2759 
Quality of the Bureaucracy  2.10  0.76  2759 
GDP per capita  2960  2050  2899 
Debt stock  19174574899  38757151326  1161 
IMF agreement  0.44  0.50  1222 
Population density  51.10  71.71  2899 
  20 Table 2. Distribution of firms according to ownership and regulation status 
  With regulatory agency  Without regulatory agency 
With private participation  109 (in 24 countries)  1 
Without private participation  84 (in 26 countries)  19 (in 13 countries) 
Note: There are seven firms operating in three countries with undefined ownership status. 
  21Table 3. Time schedule of the establishment of regulatory agencies and the 
introduction of private participation in electricity distribution 
Year  Countries introducing a regulatory agency  Countries introducing private participation 
Before 1992    Bolivia (Santa Cruz); Ivory Coast; Brazil (Pará, 
São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Tocantins) 
1992  Argentina (Buenos Aires)  Belize 
1993  Argentina (San Luis and Tucumán)  Argentina (Buenos Aires and San Luis); 
Philippines 
1994   Mali 
1995  Argentina (Catamarca and Santiago del 
Estero); Bolivia; Colombia;  
Nicaragua; South Africa 
Argentina (Formosa, La Rioja, and Santiago del 
Estero); Peru (Lima) 
1996  Argentina (Entre Ríos, Formosa, La Rioja, Río 
Negro, Salta, and San Juan);  
Mexico; Zambia 
Argentina (Catamarca, Entre Ríos, Tucumán, 
and San Juan); Bolivia (Cochabamba, La Paz, 
and Oruro); Brazil (Espírito Santo, Paraná, and 
São Paulo); Peru (Lima) 
1997 Argentina  (Jujuy and Mendoza); Brazil 
(Maranhão, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina, 
Sergipe, and Tocantins); Costa Rica; Ecuador; 
El Salvador; Georgia;  
Guatemala; Panamá; Peru 
Argentina (Jujuy, Río Negro, and Salta); Brazil 
(Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo); Colombia 
(Valle del Cauca); Czech Republic (Prague); 
Peru (Lima and Southern Peru) 
1998  Armenia; Brazil (Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do 
Sul, and São Paulo);  
Ethiopia; Ghana; Moldova; Poland; Uruguay 
Brazil (Bahia, Ceará, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rio 
Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, São 
Paulo, and Sergipe); Colombia (Cundinamarca) 
1999  Belize; Brazil (Bahia); Ivory Coast; Estonia;  
India (Andhra Pradesh and Haryana); Kenya; 
Senegal 
Argentina (Mendoza); Brazil (Pará, Paraíba, 
and São Paulo); Colombia (Cundinamarca); El 
Salvador; Guatemala (Escuintla, Guatemala, 
and Sacatepéquez); Panama; Peru (Central Peru 
and Northern Peru) 
2000  Argentina (Córdoba); Brazil (Amazonas, 
Goiás, Mato Grosso, and Rio Grande do 
Norte); Cameroon; India  (Delhi); Mali; Niger; 
Uganda 
Brazil (Espírito Santo, Maranhão, Paraná, 
Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul, and Sergipe); 
Czech Republic (Jihomoravský); Georgia; 
Guatemala (Eastern Guatemala and Western 
Guatemala); Senegal 
2001  Brazil (Pernambuco); Malawi; Namibia; 
Tanzania 
Brazil (Paraíba); Cape Verde; Moldova; 
Nicaragua 
2002  Brazil (Alagoas, Mato Grosso do Sul, and 
Paraíba); Czech Republic; Malaysia; 
Mauritania; Philippines; Slovak Republic 
Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul); Cameroon 
2003  Brazil (Acre); Cape Verde  Azerbaijan; Slovak Republic (Central Slovakia 
and Western Slovakia); Tanzania 
2004  Russia  Czech Republic (Jihočeský); Poland; Russia; 
Slovak Republic (Eastern Slovakia) 
2005  Brazil (Espírito Santo); Central African 
Republic 
 
2006 Azerbaijan   
Note: Argentina, Brazil, and India have regional regulators.  
  22 Table 4. Estimates of labor requirements 
  Dependent variable: number of employees, in logs 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory agency  -0.096  -0.092  -0.076 -0.066 -0.121 -0.175 
  [.024]*** [.027]*** [.027]***  [.030]**  [.033]*** [.065]*** 
 (0.037)***  (0.040)**  (0.042)* (0.048)  (0.053)**  (0.076)** 
Private        -0.126 -0.088 -0.117 -0.122 
     [.032]**  [.037]**  [.040]***  [.043]*** 
      (0.061)**  (0.068) (0.075) (0.087) 
Regulatory agency x Private        -0.053  0.029  0.021 
      [.038]  [.042]  [.043] 
      (0.062)  (0.070)  (0.075) 
Ln  (Sales)  0.269    0.263 0.261 0.245 0.234 
  [.071]***    [.070]*** [.070]*** [.074]*** [.074]*** 
  (0.140)*  (0.136)*  (0.137)*  (0.124)**  (0.123)* 
Ln (Sales + Network losses)    0.306         
    [.078]***      
    (0.149)**      
Ln (Connections)
  0.506 0.545 0.498 0.498 0.548 0.600 
  [.102]*** [.108]*** [.107]*** [.107]*** [.112]*** [.111]*** 
 (0.205)**  (0.218)***  (0.222)**  (0.224)** (0.208)***  (0.203)*** 
Ln  (Distribution  network)  0.042 0.009 0.041 0.042 0.018 0.002 
  [.068] [.070] [.069] [.069] [.068] [.060] 
  (0.138) (0.140) (-0.076) (0.141) (0.137) (0.112) 
Ln (Proportion of residential         -0.040 -0.035 
connections)        [.436] [.416] 
        (0.637) (0.616) 
Ln (Corruption)         -0.033 
         [.017]* 
         (0.020)* 
Ln (Corruption) x          0.030 
Regulatory agency         [.020] 
         (0.024) 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  countries 36 35 36 36 32 30 
Number  of  firms  174 171 168 168 155 153 
Observations  1097 979 1044  1044 933  908 
R-squared  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
shown in parentheses. In all cases we are estimating a translog form. To save space, second order terms are not 
shown. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
  23Table 5. Estimates of labor requirements in common support 
  Dependent variable: number of employees, in logs 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory agency  -0.119  -0.103  -0.093 -0.079 -0.139 -0.167 
  [0.026]*** [0.028]*** [0.030]*** [0.034]** [0.038]*** [0.068]** 
 (0.037)***  (0.037)***  (0.042)** (0.050) (0.056)**  (0.075)** 
Private        -0.153 -0.114 -0.133 -0.136 
      [0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.043]*** [0.046]*** 
      (0.079)*  (0.077) (0.083) (0.095) 
Regulatory agency x Private        -0.062  0.034  0.019 
      [0.044]  [0.046]  [0.048] 
      (0.068)  (0.073)  (0.077) 
Ln  (Sales)  0.354    0.379 0.381 0.367 0.346 
 [0.087]***    [0.087]***  [0.086]*** [0.091]*** [0.095]*** 
  (0.176)**    (0.170)** (0.169)** (0.156)** (0.168)** 
Ln (Sales + Network losses)    0.404         
    [0.089]***      
    (0.179)**      
Ln (Connections)
  0.436 0.471 0.404 0.399 0.439 0.496 
  [0.111]*** [0.114]*** [0.115]*** [0.115]*** [0.120]*** [0.121]*** 
 (0.214)**  (0.219)**  (0.229)*  (0.230)* (0.212)**  (0.219)** 
Ln  (Distribution  network)  0.036 0.003 0.036 0.037 0.020 -0.006 
  [0.073] [0.073] [0.075] [0.076] [0.074] [0.066] 
  (0.149) (0.146) (0.152) (0.154) (0.149) (0.123) 
Ln (Proportion of residential           -0.052  -0.044 
connections)       [0.574]  [0.551] 
       (0.871)  (0.846) 
Ln  (Corruption)        -0.021 
        [ 0 . 0 2 0 ]  
        ( 0 . 0 2 0 )  
Ln  (Corruption)  x         0.024 
Regulatory  agency       [0.022] 
        ( 0 . 0 2 5 )  
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  countries 31 31 31 31 27 27 
Number  of  firms  134 133 128 128 123 123 
Observations  880 825 827 827 756 738 
R-squared  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
shown in parentheses. In all cases we are estimating a translog form. To save space, second order terms are not 
shown. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
  24Table 6. Estimates for firm efficiency and social welfare 











Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory  agency  -0.067 -0.274 0.038 -0.541 0.021 0.225 
 [0.022]***  [0.094]***  [0.022]*  [0.182]*** [0.009]** [0.037]*** 
 (0.036)*  (0.177)  (0.033)  (0.219)** (0.018)  (0.058)*** 
Private    -0.256 0.535 -0.062 0.177 -0.010 0.112 
 [0.041]***  [0.164]***  [0.028]** [0.125]  [0.011]  [0.029]*** 
 (0.073)***  (0.267)*  (0.044) (0.152) (0.017)  (0.041)*** 
Regulatory agency x  -0.057  -0.142 -0.138 -0.411 0.047 -0.299 
Private  [0.040] [0.151]  [0.029]***  [0.403] [0.013]***  [0.043]*** 
 (0.072)  (0.234)  (0.046)***  (0.527) (0.026)*  (0.072)*** 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  countries  49 27 48 16 30 39 
Number  of  firms  209 62 207 25 162  180 
Observations  2092 475 2255 145 1579  1669 
R-squared  0.94 0.98 0.82 0.98 0.96 0.99 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
shown in parentheses. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 7. Estimates for firm efficiency and social welfare in common support 











Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory  agency  -0.073 -0.372 0.0004 -0.534  0.028  0.235 
 [0.023]***  [0.102]***  [0.021]  [0.181]*** [0.011]*** [0.041]*** 
 (0.037)**  (0.194)*  (0.031)  (0.223)** (0.024)  (0.062)*** 
Private    -0.266 0.610 -0.078 0.182 -0.003 0.087 
  [0.042]*** [0.173]*** [0.028]*** [0.126]  [0.013]  [0.037]** 
 (0.076)***  (0.302)**  (0.045)* (0.157)  (0.021) (0.051)* 
Regulatory agency x  -0.043  0.044  -0.139  -0.410  0.059  -0.329 
Private  [0.041] [0.145]  [0.029]***  [0.400] [0.016]***  [0.049]*** 
 (0.074)  (0.213)  (0.047)***  (0.529) (0.034)*  (0.083)*** 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number  of  countries  37 22 37 12 24 29 
Number  of  firms  153 51 154 18 126  129 
Observations  1684 416 1893 132 1229  1265 
R-squared  0.94 0.97 0.82 0.98 0.97 0.98 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
shown in parentheses. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% 
level. 
 